the outcome of a bottom-up process through which the Eastern experience of Europe has finally been (partially) acknowledged besides the founding experience of the Holocaust. This article will criticise these premises of the politics of recognition thesis by focusing on the history of communism-memory since 1989. From a sociological perspective, it situates this history in the post-Cold War transnational space of politics, in which actors repositioned themselves as a reaction to geopolitical restructuration. This political space, a field of positions organised by memory claims, has two characteristics.
The first is the power relation generated by the enlargement process. The debate about Europe took place between two sides with unequal resources: European organisations and countries aspiring for membership in those organisations. According to the social vision of the first, former Eastern Europe was to be reintegrated into the continental civilisation based on its universal values. In the ideological vacuum triggered by the definitive defeat of the Cold War enemy, the EU began to embrace the global Holocaust discourse (Probst 2003 , Calligaro 2015 : it localized (Zombory 2012 ) the deterritorialized memory of the Holocaust as a par excellence European historical experience, with universal significance. By the end of the 1990s, the universal moral message of Holocaust-memory has become a constitutive part of the promotion of European norms and values. At the same time, models of reconciliation (Jouhanneau and Neumayer, 2014) were developed that were supposed to appease social tension around competing interpretations of the past, and provide solidarity among actors with different visions of history. The principal model of reconciliation has become the integration of different memories into a common framework (based on canonized Holocaust-memory) allowing solidarity along commonly shared values, and the public recognition of the historical suffering of victims. The cultivation of Holocaust-memory became, by the second half of the 1990s, a "soft membership criterion" to the EU (Leggewie 2010) .
The social vision of the other side was quite different. Former communist countries had to prove that they shared European norms and values and were thus mature enough to enter its political institutions. Being not capable of influencing the criteria of their accession, they relied even more heavily on symbolic resources in the uneven political field of enlargement.
In the early 1990s, they positioned themselves as already Western nations previously "kidnapped by the East" (Kundera 1983 ) and now returning to Europe. By the end of the decade, however, their strategy changed because of the new integration policy of Europe, based on the memory of the Holocaust. The memory of communism, as will be argued in this article, is the result of this transnational interaction of norms of historical representation.
The other feature determining the relations in the power field of European politics is victims' competition (Chaumont 1997 , Novick 1999 , Maier 1993 . This structural dynamic is provoked by the uniqueness claim of the Holocaust that is challenged by competing claims of past suffering. Two sides crystallize in the conflict, one blames the other by the relativization of the Holocaust, the other accuses the one by the denial of recognition of other victims of political violence. In the discursive field of memory-claims the victim status is legitimized by the accumulation of symbolic capital, that is, prestige, measured by the extent of human suffering. Memory tends to be sacralised (Todorov 1995 (Todorov , 2000 , as actors strive to monopolize the principles of historical representation. Politics follow the "rules of the game", that should be respected as a precondition of participation. At the same time, taking position in the field involves the possible change of the rules (Bourdieu 1985) .
The particularity of the European memory competition, in relation to earlier ones, was the primarily geographical reality of the social world to define. Since the EU enlargement meant the change of existing political borders, the debate on the meaning of Europe reached far beyond the sphere of the symbolic. The reconstitution of Europe's past inherently involved the tracing of political boundaries of Europe both as idea and as geographical space. Accordingly, the spatial aspect of post-Cold War repositioning constitutes an important element of the following study. This paper argues that the emergence of a memory of communism and its later European canonisation is due to the repositioning process in transnational political space. It will prove that the "historical experience" of communism as presented in the literature on the "politics of recognition" is the outcome of the historical process through which, by the end of the 1990s, anti-communist discourse was reformulated according to the prevailing European norms of historical consciousness. Communism as the Eastern experience of Europe was born in relation to the universal memory of the Holocaust, perceived by the actors as Western.
The empirical verification of the "politics of positioning" thesis elaborated here poses some difficulties. Current studies usually conceptualise transnational politics as the space of European political institutions, and thus focus on post-accession discourses of memory.
Before the accession in 2004-2006, however, political actors of the post-communist countries did not take part in the decisive European organisations, but they made part of the transnational space of politics defined above. As a reaction to the lack of institutional resources in transnational politics, new institutions were created in the associated countries, such as historical commissions, institutes of national memory, and museums of communism, where the continental debate was hoped to be controlled. The main methodological difficulty is that this institutional landscape is diverse, scattered and imbedded in the national contexts.
In the following, I will empirically analyse the discourse about communism in the case of memorial museums, because these are historically the first institutional manifestation of commemorating communism.
From museums in the European Union, I took those, which exhibit communism in an explicit way, that is, dedicate their existence to this cause. From these I chose those having an additional commemorative function besides that of historical representation (see Table 1 ). I consider memorial museums of communism as institutionalized claims taking position in transnational political space: they reclaim the supposedly forgotten memory of communism, in relation to the memory of the Holocaust. Museums that, though memorial, display only one aspect of communism (such as the "Runde Ecke" Memorial Museum and Stasi Bunker Museum in Leipzig, Germany), or exhibit communism without performing a memory-claim (the DDR Museum in Berlin, for instance) are excluded from the scope of this research.
Though empirically focusing on museums, the object of this study is the changing discourse on communism. I will analyse this discourse using diverse primary sources on the museums (direct observations, inauguration speeches, journal articles, exhibit catalogues, official websites) and secondary data analysis (case studies on each selected institution). Instead of providing detailed analyses of each exhibition, this study aims at explaining the emergence of a specific vision of communism by putting them into a wider transnational, historical and sociological context.
In the following, I will first explore the historical knowledge production related to the museums; second, I will discuss their initiation, particularly the role of the state that embraced commemorative anticommunism by the end of the 1990s; third, I will look at the way European norms of historical representation are applied in the exhibitions; and finally, fourth, I will discuss the significance of the museum sites in post-Cold War transnational repositioning. Besancon, speaks of a "sharp contrast " (1997: 27) between the academic and public recognition of the crimes of Nazism and those of communism. Providing the reasons for this unbalance, the historian constructs the detailed narrative of Great Occultation: even though there were several testimonies and scholarly works on the criminal nature of communism, Courtois argues, the world, especially the West "refused to face reality" and by this refusal, "it was co-conspirator in the lie " (1997: 36) . The reasons given by Courtois for the alleged silence around the Truth of communism that proved to be particularly influential in postcommunist circles are the following: communism legitimized itself by revolutionary passion;
the Soviet Union could gain legitimacy from participating in the victory over Nazism; the ideology of antifascism could be reactivated by exploiting that the Holocaust had become the image of the ultimate Evil in history.
The myth of contumacious silence that resists any kind of clarification provides moral legitimacy to the cause of history's revision: the "suppressed" memory of communism must be reclaimed, thus its truth be disclosed, and the human dignity of victims restored. What is more, historical justice must be done, thus breaking communism's continuous hold on the present. Courtois, as other proponents of the same cause, finds the paradigm of historical justice in the Nuremberg trials that he -mistakenly -interprets as a reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust. The conclusion is that communism also needs its own Nuremberg trials.
From the need to historical justice comes the changing role of the historian, who is driven not only by the "duty of history" to accumulate knowledge of whatever controversial and tabooized historical phenomena, but also by the "duty of memory", a moral obligation to survivors' capacity of witnessing and not on the moral obligation to respect the suffering of innocent victims. As a consequence, the idea of equal criminality grounded by the equal respect of past suffering is lacking form the argumentation. "The same thing" demanded by the author refers not to the suffering of the victims but to the legitimacy of condemning communism and pursuing its collaborators. Moreover, the desired future status of communism as "another holocaust" (or "soviet genocide" in the Baltics) is unique, communism is not put in the same framework with the Holocaust; instead, the effective international condemnation of Nazism is used as analogy. Consequently, commemorating the Holocaust is not "our duty".
The construction of "our type of suffering" was eventually deeply influenced by the representational canon developed in Europe in the 1990s. During this transformation, anticommunist discourse on memory lost its confronting and exceptionalist nature and began to be "Europeanized", adjusted to the prevailing norms of historical memory and reconciliation.
Instead of presenting its uniqueness in the history of political violence, the memory of Soviet repression was put into a common framework with the Holocaust presented as the constitutive European experience. This entailed that the relation of the two memories acquired central significance in political struggles, and the refusal of the importance of cultivating Holocaustmemory became highly illegitimate.
National suffering under double occupation It happened to be decisive that, by the end of the 1990s, post-communist state governments, eager to meet European expectations to "coming to terms with" their totalitarian pasts, began to take position in the discourse of commemorating communism. This resulted in the "second wave" of museums, established or encouraged by governments. In the Baltic states, due to international pressure on commemorating the Holocaust, the conflict was consolidated by state efforts to "reconcile" Jewish and national suffering, which resulted in the official terminology of "double occupation" (Budryte 2005: 184-186 ) and the strategy of comparison, that is displaying the Holocaust in order to picture the degree of suffering under Soviet occupation (Bonnard and Meckl, 2007) . In 1998 the three Baltic presidents initiated the formation of national commissions of historians to study the crimes against humanity of both Nazism and Communism (Onken 2007) . At the same time, the lack of authentic objects reduces the constraints of fabricating historical experience. All the more, that it is coupled with an authoritative attitude towards the display.
Unlike in cases of museums on the move from object to experience, memorial museums of communism exclude the audience from contributing to the concept of exhibition and deprive them of the possibility to explore subjective but authentic experiences. Though the House of Terror, for instance, displays some objects authentic to the site in particular and to the subject of exhibit in general, yet it obscures the boundary between the different types of objects on display: authentic, fabricated and fake, unclarified (Frazon and K. Horváth 2002) . Thus it creates a decontextualized exhibition space, in which objects are put on stage in a theatre-like installation, where meanings associating communism with terror, crime and violence can be almost freely fabricated. After all, authentic "objects of communism", except the few items of torture and violence, evoke the everyday life in existing socialisms which would definitely risk the ideologically preferred meaning-construction of communism as terror and crime.
Anyhow, most memorial-museums of communism possess one unique object that can serve as the single source of authenticity for the entire exhibition: the site. suffering and death turns the museum into a memorial, a site of mourning. To the criticism that the institution was created and opened as part of the political campaign of the ruling conservative party, the director of the institution, personal consultant of the Prime Minister at the time, replied that it had been created "in the memory of the suffering of a nation with the burden of history. We wanted to create a memorial to the victims"; those who project political intentions behind it "are incapable of paying tribute to the memory of the victims" (Schmidt 2003: 179) . Mária Schmidt argued that the House of Terror is supposed to foster the common thinking about the last decades, so that "finally the work of mourning begin, the necessity of which is so incontestably described by our Nobel-prize laureate, Imre Kertész, in relation to the Holocaust" (Schmidt 2003: 185) . European enlargement process, communism-memory was reclaimed according to the European normative and value system prescribed by the memory of the Holocaust. As a consequence of adopting those norms, early post-Cold War anti-communism, striving to legitimately condemn communism in a similar way Nazism had been condemned by the negative image of the Holocaust, transformed into a memory-discourse. By the end of the 1990s, the memory claim of communism began to focus on the duty to remember the historical trauma of communism in order to prevent its reoccurrence, on the need to restore the human dignity of victims, and on the moral lesson that the memory of communism is supposed to transmit. Since in the political context of European enlargement refusing to cultivate the memory of the Holocaust was highly illegitimate, the memory of communism was born as the "twin brother" of Holocaust-memory. In the transnational political context, the Europeanized memory of communism produced a legitimate differentia specifica of the newcomers in relation to old member states. It has been publicly reclaimed as an Eastern
European experience in relation to universal Holocaust-memory perceived as Western. At the same time, the idea of "double victimhood" served as a symbolic resource in the ongoing transnational competition of victims' "historical experiences", differing mainly in terms of geographical reference. Memorial-museums of communism played a crucial role in this localisation since they served as legitimate evidence of the fact that here communist terror also took place.
Memorial-museums of communism can be considered as laboratories where the main elements of the discursive repertoire applied in post-accession political debates about Europe were elaborated in a pan-European way. Most importantly, they create, visualise and materialize a political space which is organised according to the equality of victimhood. What The great debate on European history happened to be nothing more than a "comfortable controversy", in which "Each side is so palpably wrong about so many major issues that the other cannot help but feel that it must, in turn, be right." (Snyder, 2013: 88) 
